Archives

Waltz with Bashar

R2P and Deterrence in Damascus: When Superpowers Collide
Thousands of pro-Assad supporters praised Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov as they visited Damascus on Wednesday. At the same time, about a 100 miles away, Syrian military forces indiscriminately bombed the city of Homs. The Russian envoy’s presence was perceived as confirming the Kremlin’s support of its sole Middle Eastern ally, following a joint veto of UN with China heavily criticized internationally but celebrated and defendedin the Iranian and Chinese press.A month ago, a Russian aircraft carrier docked in Tartus, Syria, one of two remaining naval bases, to reportedly deliver ammunition for the military of Bashar al-Assad. The February 5 veto was not Russia’s first – of all the vetoes ever cast at the Security Council, half came from Moscow, a third from the Washington – but it is only China’s eighth in 33 years. Two of them have dealt with Syria, despite a lack of Chinese investments or military presence, leading some to speculatethe Panda is letting the Bear lead in the Syrian ballroom.

Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi proposed to his UN counterpart a joint observer mission Wednesday, two weeks after Arab League observers left Syria, citing increased violence. The Arab world has nearly completely condemned the Russian-Chinese veto and continued courtship of Assad. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has called for an international meeting to coordinate regime change, following statements two weeks ago detailing almost 10,000 Syrian refugees in Turkey, giving Ankara a new aggressive backbeat.

All roads lead to Damascus, it seems. Domestic Russian (and American and Turkish) electioneering and unrest undoubtedly play into international (in)action. After a year of large public protests and legal limitations on nominees, ballots will be counted March 4 for aspirants to the Kremlin. Contenders to Vladimir Putin’s presidency agreed with the ex-KGB agent’s “no bull in a china shop” decision to back the Syrian regime – with the exception of Mikhail Prokhorov. While acknowledging the $20 billion Russian business interests in Syria and blasting Qatari and Kuwaiti coverage of the repression, the mineral magnate and darkhorse presidential candidate Prokhorov echoed NATO allies calls for Assad to step down.

Perhaps fearing a spread of popular uprising through the Kremlin, Putin followed the Security Council veto by warning of an international “cult of violence” with dangerous implications. What was a no-fly zone over Libya morphed into aerial bombardment, Western arming of rebels, and a brutal Saharan regicide. To avoid a similar conclusion, Putin’s envoy Lavrov said Syrian vice president Farouk al-Sharaa will contact the opposition (some of which are based in Turkey) to begin peace talks.

But as gruesome footage filters out of Syria, net activists assail Russian cyberspace, the Pentagon assess the possibility of an assault, and domestic campaigns ignite, can  the Turkish Wolf, the Russian Bear, the American Eagle, and the Chinese Panda dance in the Damascus china shop?

A somber situation and a breakout

Protests in Daraa lead to death, concessions… and a Syrian Revolution?

A few weeks ago the SISMEC Weekly Bulletin reported on Syria’s Bashar al-Asad remaining relatively undisturbed by the uprisings taking place throughout the region.  He had endured small-scale demonstrations, largely in solidarity with Egypt and Tunisia, and quickly stepped in to quell protests against police brutality in Damascus.   In response to the regional protests, Bashar told The Wall Street Journal that Arab leaders needed to accommodate the new era descending upon the region, but that Syria was immune to such mass public protests.  It appeared that once these waves had passed all would be quiet again. However, on March 18th after Friday prayer, residents of the Sunni town of Daraa (approximately 100 miles south of Damascus) took to the streets chanting “God, Syria and Freedom” as well as “the people demand the downfall of corruption.”  The impetus for such protests appears to have been residual pro-democracy sentiments mixed with particularly local agricultural and corruption concerns, notably against Bashar’s cousin and Syriatel owner Rami Makhlouf.

Over the course of the past week thousands have continued to take to the streets in Daraa, increasing in numbers each day in response to the use of force, ranging from water cannon to live ammunition.  Yet early morning March 23rd marked a new apex in the use of force.  Syrian troops—reportedly a unit under the control of Bashar’s brother Maher—opened fire on the Omari Mosque, which had become the heart of demonstrations and triage since the beginning of the protests.  The death toll from the Omari Mosque is reported from 37 to over 100, in addition to at least a dozen from the days prior, and overall hundreds of protesters and activists have been detained.

Yet despite Bashar’s resort to lethal force, he appears to have implemented some sort of hybrid containment policy for the demonstrations in Daraa. In addition to troops surrounding the city and increased security presence within the city, he has commissioned a package of concessions aimed at placating the protesters. These include releasing the children whose arrest for pro-democracy graffiti sparked the protests as well as the removal of the governor of Daraa and the release of those detained in the city over the course of the protests.  Most recently, Syrian government spokeswoman and advisor to Bashar, Buthaina Shaaban, discussed efforts to “study” the lifting of the state of emergency law under which Syria has been operating since 1963, allow political parties, free up the media and increase pay and health care for government employees. Interestingly, unlike the anti-regime demonstrations elsewhere in the region, those in Syria have largely refrained from seeking Bashar’s ouster, instead calling for an end to corruption and increased economic reform.  Yet one may ask whether this is too little, too late and whether Bashar’s overtures to this new era in the region could possibly
overshadow the devastating use of violent force against the protesters.

UPDATE: Friday, March 25th seems to be Syria’s breakout day.  The rallying cry that fills the mosques and streets of major cities and small towns all over Syria is “with our souls and with our blood we will redeem Daraa.” Casualties are mounting and unrest has spilled over into Damascus with clashes occurring between Daraa supporters and pro-regime groups in front of the Umayyad Mosque.  The presence of both Bashar supporters and those displaying solidarity with Daraa in streets across the country is a common occurrence.  However, some of the protesters now appear to be calling for the ouster of Bashar as portrayed in graffiti using the slogan “your turn has come, doctor.”

How a terminal illness spared the regime

Syrian regime stabilized by…pulmonary fibrosis?



Despite Facebook calls for “days of rage” and imploding mansions of hereditary presidencies in the neighborhood, Syria’s Bashar al-Asad has remained largely unscathed in his Damascus abode.  The man some pejoratively call “the Doctor” (a reference to his training as an ophthalmologist and perceived hasty insertion into Syrian politics after the death of his older brother, Basil) succeeded his father Hafez al-Asad after the latter’s death of pulmonary fibrosis in 2000 at the age of seventy.  Could it be that had Hafez lived to see his late 70s or 80s—as has Egypt’s Mubarak—the Asad republican dynasty would be on the same chopping block as that of the Mubaraks, the Qadafis and the Salehs?  Or is there something coincidental about pulmonary fibrosis taking the man’s life just as he reached 30 years of rule (Ben Ali, 24; Mubarak, 30; Qadafi, 42)?



In reality, it’s a broader combination of factors, ranging from the security apparatus to the economic situation to Bashar’s anti-Israel and anti-West posture…simply put, the Syrians just don’t hate him as much as those who have fallen or are falling.  Yet the fact that Hafez’s death passed the torch more than a decade prior to the events of the past few months is significant.  As a result, Bashar was able to settle into his office at the ripe old age of thirty-four, marry an eminently capable and gorgeous woman ten years his junior and establish his regime as one of relative youth with untapped potential.  During his first decade in power, he has maintained the pillars of his father’s legitimacy while implementing gradual economic and political reforms, many of which have lessened the severity of anti-regime dissent.  Against this backdrop, it appears as though the untimely death of the Lion of Damascus may, in fact, have been at the opportune time to stabilize his familial legacy as the only hereditary presidency on the block.